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THE MIDWIFE AND THE FORCEPS:
THE WILD TERRAIN OF MIDWIFERY LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES
AND WHERE NORTH DAKOTA IS HEADING
IN THE BIRTHING DEBATE

The first thing which I can record concerning myself is, that I was
born. These are wonderful words. This life, to which neither time nor
eternity can bring diminution this everlasting soul, began.
My mind loses itself in these depths.
–Groucho Marx 1
People have told me it would probably be easier to do a drug deal in
Missouri than to find a midwife.
–Dr. Elizabeth Allemann 2
I.

INTRODUCTION

On the morning of February 7, 2007, Senator Judy Lee stood before the
North Dakota Senate Human Services Committee and introduced Senate
Bill 2377, officially ushering the state into its first foray with the legal
status of lay midwives.3 The bill was introduced out of a concern over the
unregulated status of lay midwives in North Dakota and the desire of the
Legislature to require some form of training for individuals who wished to
assist in home births.4 By the time Senate Bill 2377 passed to the House of
Representatives, it had been amended to direct the Legislative Council to
conduct an interim study on whether current state law properly addressed
obstetrical services performed by lay midwives.5
1. Quoteland.com, http://www.quoteland.com/author.asp?AUTHOR_ID=1785 (last visited
Jan. 14, 2007).
2. Liz Heitzman, Midwife Ban Leaves Family Scrambling, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIB. (Mo.),
Mar. 1, 2007, at A12.
3. Hearing on S. 2377 Before the S. Comm. on Human Servs., 2007 Leg., 60th Sess. 1 (N.D.
2007) [hereinafter Senate Committee Hearings]. A “lay midwife” is one who does not have a
nursing degree, but acquires experience solely through practice and apprenticeship. RAYMOND G.
DEVRIES, REGULATING BIRTH: MIDWIVES, MEDICINE, & THE LAW 17 (1985).
4. Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 1 (statement of Sen. Judy Lee, Chairwoman,
S. Comm. on Human Serv.).
5. Engrossed S. 2377, 2007 Leg., 60th Sess. (N.D. 2007). Interim studies are processes
whereby the Legislative Council appoints a committee to research a particular issue for possible
future legislation.
North Dakota Legislative Council Interim Study Procedure,
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Both the Senate and House Human Services Committees heard
impassioned testimony from both sides of the issue.6 Representatives from
the medical community argued that those who hold “themselves out as
someone who can provide medical services” must meet a standard of
competency and perform under a standard of care.7 Conversely, opponents
of the bill stated that “there are going to be a lot of people like ourselves
that are going to birth at home, no matter what the law says.”8 In the end,
the House Human Services Committee unanimously recommended a Do
Not Pass on the bill, believing that any study would inevitably result in
unnecessary regulations.9 The House followed its recommendation, voting
ninety to three to oppose the further study of lay midwives and the laws
regulating them.10
With the Legislature opting against regulation or study, North Dakota
remains among a significant minority of states with no official laws
regulating (or prohibiting) lay midwives, allowing them instead to practice
only by judicial or statutory interpretation.11 However, with no laws on the
books, these states unintentionally promulgate a wealth of potential problems, as there are no regulations or licensing standards to ensure the
competency of midwives.12 Additionally, the vague legal climate actually
exposes midwives to the threat of being charged with unlawfully practicing
medicine.13 By regulating midwives through sensible, relatively non-burdensome licensing requirements, North Dakota could simultaneously ensure
the continued safety of its mothers and newborn citizens, the ability of

http://www.legis.nd.gov/council/general/interim.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2007). The committee
reports its findings to the full Legislative Council prior to the next legislative session. Id. The
council then drafts the committee’s recommendations into a bill or resolution, and presents them
to the Legislative Assembly. Id.
6. Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 1-8; Hearing on S. 2377 Before the H.
Comm. on Human Servs., 2007 Leg., 60th Sess. 1-14 (N.D. 2007) [hereinafter House Committee
Hearings].
7. Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 1-2 (statement of Bruce Levi, North Dakota
Medical Association).
8. House Committee Hearings, supra note 6, at 8 (statement of Julie Liffrig).
9. See id. at 1 (statement of Rep. Chuck Damschen) (“I think the study will end up in regulation. Childbirth has been around as long or longer than medicine.”).
10. H. Journal, 2007 Leg., 60th Sess. at 1147 (2007), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/
assembly/60-2007/journals/hr57.pdf#Page1147.
11. Laura D. Hermer, Midwifery: Strategies on the Road to Universal Legislation, 13
HEALTH MATRIX 325, 355 (2003). For a list of the other states which neither regulate nor prohibit
lay midwifery, see infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
12. See Hermer, supra note 11, at 355 (“Such states give [midwives] legal sanction to
practice, but do not otherwise regulate them.”).
13. Id.
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women to choose home births, and the right of midwives to assist in the
birthing process.14
The debate over midwifery has now been a source of controversy and
bad feelings between opponents and proponents of the practice for over 100
years, and it has not aged well.15 It has become representative of a kind of
meta-medical Battle of the Bulge, where midwives and the medical community have declared open war over the right to assist in childbirth, and there
has been no cease fire in sight.16 However, unlike traditional concepts of
war, here the battlefields are the American courtrooms, where midwives
have both been prosecuted for circumventing state statutes or practicing
medicine without a license, and have levied their own challenges against
allegedly restrictive legislation.17 Meanwhile, mothers throughout the
country wait nervously in the wings, concerned that attacks on lay midwives are synonymous with attacks on home births, and national organizations tentatively pick sides in the dispute.18
North Dakota resides as only a microcosm of the larger debate over
midwifery; North Dakota is one of seven states in which midwives deliver
less than four percent of births.19 However, the recent legislative session

14. See discussion infra Part IV.B (proposing specific provisions which take into consideration both safety concerns and the interests of midwives and their supporters).
15. See generally Stacey A. Tovino, American Midwifery Litigation and State Legislative
Preferences for Physician-Controlled Childbirth, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 61, 64-67 (2004)
(discussing the historical friction between midwifery supporters and the medical community).
16. See Adam Liptak, Prosecution of Midwife Casts Light on Home Births, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
3, 2006, at A12 (“[Midwives] say the ability of women to choose to give birth at home is under
assault from a medical establishment dominated by men who, for reasons of money and status,
resent a centuries-old tradition that long ago anticipated the concerns of modern feminism.”); see
also Hermer, supra note 11, at 336 (“The midwife is a relic of barbarism. In civilized countries,
the midwife is wrong, has always been wrong. . . . All admit that the midwife is wrong: It has
been proven time and time again that it is impossible to make her right.” (quoting Dr. Joseph B.
DeLee, Progress Toward Ideal Obstetrics, 6 TRANSACTIONS AM. ASS’N FOR THE STUDY AND
PREVENTION OF INFANT MORTALITY 6, 114-23 (1915))).
17. See Susan Corcoran, To Become a Midwife: Reducing Legal Barriers to Entry Into the
Midwifery Profession, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 649, 661 (2002) (noting that suits arise from criminal or
civil actions against midwives for practicing medicine, nursing, or nurse-midwifery without a
license, and also from midwives suing medical and nursing boards to overturn highly restrictive
statutes or to clarify ambiguities in the law).
18. See Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 4 (testimony of Becky Olsen) (“I urge
you to vote against this proposed bill and allow parents to continue having the right to home
births.”); Kenneth C. Johnson & Betty-Anne Daviss, Outcomes of Planned Home Births With
Certified Professional Midwives: Large Prospective Study in North America, 330 BRIT. MED. J.
1416, 1416 (2005), available at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/reprint_abr/330/7505/1416 (noting that,
while organizations like the American Public Health Association have adopted policies promoting
or acknowledging the viability of home births, many organizations, such as the American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, oppose the practice).
19. Ed Brock, Oh Baby! Popularity of Midwives Rises in State, HENRY DAILY HERALD
(Ga.), Feb. 17, 2006, available at http://www.henryherald.com/cnhi/henrydailyherald/features/l
ocal_story_048201219.html. The other six states are Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Missouri,
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has shown just how combustible the topic of midwifery is in the state and
how vociferous its supporters and opponents are on the topics of choice and
safety, respectively.20 Furthermore, midwifery has seen a resurgence in
recent years, which has sparked a related boom in midwifery prosecutions
and statutory challenges.21 With its newfound sea legs, the issue of midwifery in North Dakota is all but certain to rear its head once again.22
In the context of this background, this note illustrates the many facets
of the midwifery debate and what options North Dakota may have when it
comes time to construct reasonable midwifery legislation. More specifically, Part II discusses the history of midwives in America, including the
long-running feud between midwives and physicians, and the differences
between lay and nurse-midwives.23 Part III explores the legal status of midwifery, including the statutory constructions of various states, the prosecutions of midwives, and the constitutional challenges which have risen over
the years.24 Part IV analyzes North Dakota’s recent attempt at regulation
with Senate Bill 2377 and provides guideposts for constructing future
legislation that can protect the health and safety of North Dakota’s mothers
and children, and still remain fair to any lay midwives practicing within the
state.25 Finally, this note concludes that, while regulating midwifery is both
a probable and desirable outcome in North Dakota, any such regulations
need not affect the ability of midwives to practice in the state, nor prevent
any woman from choosing how—and where—to bring her children into the
world.

Kansas, and Louisiana. Id. Midwifery is most popular in Georgia, Alaska, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Oregon, and Vermont, where midwives attend over sixteen percent of births. Id.
20. See generally Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 1-8, and House Committee
Hearings, supra note 6, at 1-14 (indicating that nine people testified in favor of the bill, and
seventeen testified in opposition).
21. See A. Frank Adams III et al., Occupational Licensing of a Credence Good: The
Regulation of Midwifery, 69 S. ECON. J. 659, 659 (2003) (noting that between 1975 and 1995, the
amount of midwife-attended births rose from .09% to 5.95% of all births); see also Charles
Wolfson, Midwives and Home Birth: Social, Medical and Legal Perspectives, 37 HASTINGS L.J.
909, 930 (1986) (noting that over twenty years ago, no laws of general application had been
imposed on midwifery, so their constitutionality had yet to be tested).
22. See Corcoran, supra note 17, at 659 (discussing states like Missouri and Minnesota
where, once initial attempts at regulation are made, the issue boomerangs through every session
until legislation is finally passed).
23. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the history of midwifery and the distinctions
between midwives).
24. See discussion infra Part III (focusing on midwifery law in the United States).
25. See discussion infra Part IV (discussing the legal status of midwives in North Dakota).
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II. MIDWIFERY THROUGH A HISTORICAL LENS
While the general scope of the current midwifery debate focuses on the
legal status of the profession, the conflict cannot be separated from basic
principles of midwifery and the historical feud between midwives and medical professionals.26 Such a broad analysis must begin with an understanding of the different forms of midwives.27 Of equal importance is to
appreciate how the philosophies of midwives differ from those of physicians, and how they have led to the current call for midwifery regulations.28
A. THE TYPES OF MODERN MIDWIVES
Any analysis of midwifery regulation must intrinsically begin with a
basic differentiation between the two types of modern midwives: certified
“nurse-midwives” and lay—or direct-entry—midwives.29 While both types
of midwives focus on the concept of normal and natural childbirth, they
differ when it comes to the philosophy, tradition, and the scope of their
practice.30 Furthermore, states generally distinguish between the two forms
of midwives, resulting in very different legal results.31
Before nurse-midwives may attend deliveries, they must acquire nursing degrees and complete studies in standard gynecology and obstetrics.32
As registered nurses, these midwives usually obtain accreditation at a
master’s level and have passed a national certification examination, giving
them “the highest degree of traditionally accepted medical training” of
practicing midwives.33 However, nurse-midwives also come under scrutiny
for straying from the natural approach to childbirth because of their ties to
the medical community.34 Since almost all of their work is done in a
hospital setting under physician supervision, nurse-midwives often “capitulate to the wishes of obstetricians and other childbirth practitioners.” 35
Consequently, they generally adhere to established medical procedures and

26. See Hermer, supra note 11, at 329 (noting that, to understand the present debate over
midwifery, it is important to understand the basic concepts of the profession).
27. See discussion infra Part II.A (comparing and contrasting lay and nurse-midwives).
28. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing the different approaches of midwives and
physicians, and the statistical analyses which have led to regulations on the midwifery profession).
29. Tovino, supra note 15, at 68.
30. Corcoran, supra note 17, at 654.
31. Tovino, supra note 15, at 68.
32. Id. at 69.
33. Hermer, supra note 11, at 333. See Corcoran, supra note 17, at 653-54 (noting that
nurse-midwives are certified by the American College of Nurse-Midwives).
34. Hermer, supra note 11, at 334.
35. Id. at 326.
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supervision.36 As it stands, a properly licensed nurse-midwife may practice
legally everywhere in the United States.37
Lay midwives, on the other hand, are more commonly associated with
“more natural and less intervention-oriented” home births.38 These midwives generally do not have nursing degrees, but have acquired experience
through practice and apprenticeship.39 While some lay midwives become
licensed if their home state requires it, others practice illegally, either by not
meeting the codified requirements or by practicing in a state that does not
legally recognize the profession.40 Lay midwives who attain certification
do so through the North American Registry of Midwives (NARM), an
offshoot of the Midwives Alliance of North America (MANA).41 According to MANA, there are approximately 3,000 midwives in the United States
without any formal training, roughly one-third of whom have been certified
by NARM.42
Even with the two factions of midwives focusing on natural childbirth,
physician-assisted births remain the norm throughout the country.43 However, this has not always been the case, as midwives previously dominated
the birthing industry in the United States.44 Between these two points in
time was the spark of a power struggle between midwives and physicians,
which has led to a historical conflict that has defined the birthing care
system today.45
B. A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF MIDWIFERY AND THE PHYSICIANMIDWIFE CONFLICT
While midwifery may not qualify as the “world’s oldest profession,” it
may well be the oldest “health profession” in history.46 In a sense, the
36. Id. at 333.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 327. In fact, many argue that nurse-midwives and physicians, who are trained to
deliver babies in hospitals, would make worse home birth attendants than lay midwives. JUDY
BARRETT LITOFF, AMERICAN MIDWIVES 143-44 (1978) (quoting LESTER DESSEZ HAZELL,
COMMONSENSE CHILDBIRTH 145 (1976)). Since what is normal in a hospital may be abnormal in
a home setting, nurse-midwives and physicians would have the potential to provide inappropriate
care to patients who choose home births. Id. Hospital trained individuals can cause problems by
trying to “force what is happening in the mold of what they know.” Id. at 144.
39. DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 17.
40. Hermer, supra note 11, at 327.
41. Corcoran, supra note 17, at 653, 653 n.29.
42. Liptak, supra note 16, at A12.
43. Hermer, supra note 11, at 328.
44. BRIAN E. BURTCH, TRIALS OF LABOUR: THE RE-EMERGENCE OF MIDWIFERY 80 (1994).
45. Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492, 578 (1993).
46. Donna Diers, Future of Nurse Midwives in American Health Care, in NURSING IN THE
1980S: CRISES, OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES 267, 268 (Linda H. Aiken ed., 1982).

2008]

NOTE

225

principles of midwifery date back to early civilization, when childbirth was
a shared experience of the community, with women aiding each other
during labor, delivery, and post-partum.47 The first signs of regulated midwifery appeared in England during the Middle Ages, when midwives were
appointed and licensed by the church to ensure the “moral character” of
birth attendants.48 This incarnation of the midwife not only assisted women
during labor, but was expected to prevent abortions and infanticide, establish paternity, and perform baptisms—none of which was done for profit.49
However, it was around this same time that the practice of medicine began
to establish itself as a male-dominated field.50 In one telling example,
English physicians petitioned Parliament regarding the “worthless and
presumptuous women who usurped the profession,” and asked for the
imposition of fines and imprisonment on all women who attempted to “use
the practyse [sic] of Fisyk [sic].”51
Midwives—an inherently female-dominated profession by nature—
maintained a monopoly on the area of childbirth well into the eighteenth
century.52 This domination held true in the newly formed American colonies as well, where childbirth remained a communal event, with midwives
and other women in the community lending assistance to the delivering
mother.53 Physicians generally intervened into childbirth only to perform
caesarian sections or to extract stillborn infants.54 This hands-off approach
was largely due to the “technological simplicity of early medicine,” which
meant that physicians could offer little more to a woman in labor than could
a midwife.55 During this time, there existed a “professional courtesy”

47. BURTCH, supra note 44, at 64-65. Midwifery as a profession has been traced back “at
least as far” as Jewish captivity in Egypt. DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 22.
48. BURTCH, supra note 44, at 65. The church also had a major “interest” in regulating
midwifery as a means to prevent witchcraft, as church leaders looked with suspicion upon the
typical midwife aids of “herbs, potions and spells.” DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 23.
49. BURTCH, supra note 44, at 65.
50. BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, WITCHES, MIDWIVES, AND NURSES: A
HISTORY OF WOMEN HEALERS 19 (1973).
51. Id. American physicians also joined the cause, as one prominent New York obstetrician
urged the government to enact laws to place “midwifery, as all other branches of medical
practices . . . in the hands of the medical profession, where it belongs.” LITOFF, supra note 38, at
23.
52. BURTCH, supra note 44, at 65. See LITOFF, supra note 38, at 3 (“Midwifery has been the
almost exclusive province of women throughout recorded history.”).
53. Tovino, supra note 15, at 63. Midwives of this period would often begin their practices
by watching deliveries before slowly integrating themselves into a “more active role” in the
birthing processes. Id.
54. BURTCH, supra note 44, at 65.
55. Tovino, supra note 15, at 64.
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between midwives and physicians, where the former were generally left
undisturbed to assist in childbirth.56
However, this courtesy began to wane as universities—to which
women were largely excluded—began teaching the practice of gynecology
and surgery.57 Innovations such as anesthesia and obstetrical forceps
became available to physicians and—“as forceps were legally classified as a
surgical instrument,” requiring a medical degree to utilize—the tools were
off-limits to women.58 Moreover, the medical field—rank with lack of
diversity—began to view midwives as competition.59 Allowing such a contingent to practice in the field not only deprived doctors of the experience
they needed under this new gynecological science, but promoted the idea
that an uneducated person could perform the work of a medical professional.60 Childbirth had become a lucrative business, and physicians were
on the cusp of staking an official claim in the market.61 As late as 1900,
approximately half of all births in the United States were midwife-attended
home births, and by 1950 more than eighty percent of all deliveries
occurred in hospital settings, under the direct supervision of a doctor.62
The methods and philosophies of midwives and physicians stand in
vivid contrast to each other.63 Proponents argue that midwives believe that
pregnancy and childbirth are normal, natural processes for women.64 Under
this viewpoint, a laboring mother should receive encouragement and assistance from a midwife and her family in a “natural and comfortable” home
environment, but only “occasional” guidance rather than direct supervisory
control.65

56. Id. (citing LAUREL THATCHER ULRICH, A MIDWIFE’S TALE: THE LIFE OF MARTHA
BALLARD, BASED ON HER DIARY, 1785-1812 58 (1991)).
57. BURTCH, supra note 44, at 65. See LITOFF, supra note 38, at 9 (describing early medical
schools established in the United States which limited enrollment to male students).
58. EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 50, at 20. See LITOFF, supra note 38, at 19 (noting
that many were opposed to anesthesia at its inception, as they believed that the pain and suffering
of childbirth was what caused women to love their children).
59. Tovino, supra note 15, at 66.
60. Id. (quoting ULRICH, supra note 56, at 254).
61. See EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 50, at 20 (“[I]n the [seventeenth] and
[eighteenth] centuries it was possible for male practitioners to make serious inroads into that last
preserve of female healing—midwifery.”).
62. Tovino, supra note 15, at 67.
63. Hermer, supra note 11, at 330.
64. Id. at 332.
65. Michael A. Pike, Restriction of Parental Rights to Home Births Via State Regulation of
Traditional Midwifery, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 609, 609 (1997).
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The physician approach, on the other hand, is viewed as more “diseaseoriented.”66 The medical theory, according to the pro-midwife faction, presupposes that birth is a series of risks that medical doctors must “systemize,
control, and fit into an established time frame.”67 This “no case is normal
until it is over” viewpoint has historically played well in legislative hearings
and through expert testimony in the courts.68 These talking points have
contributed invaluably to the wellspring of regulatory legislation and midwifery prosecutions in the past century.69 However, that regulations
requiring licensure and training have been imposed on lay midwives begs
the question of whether the law even needs to hold midwives to a certain
standard of care.70
C. THE STATISTICAL BEDROCK OF THE PHYSICIAN—MIDWIFERY
APPROACHES
Many studies show that midwife-attended births are “just as safe, if not
safer than, medical care in low-risk childbirth.”71 In fact, a report by the
Department of Consumer Affairs stated that services provided by both lay
and nurse-midwives tended toward lower infant morbidity and mortality
rates.72 The California Legislature, in an attempt to lessen restrictions on
lay midwives, made findings that stressed the “good outcomes” and “cost
effectiveness” of birthing with midwifery assistance.73
One of the most comprehensive studies, conducted in 2000 by
members of the Public Health Agency of Canada and the International
Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics, surveyed over 5400 women

66. Hermer, supra note 11, at 332. One physician colorfully described the “abnormal”
nature of childbirth as follows:
If a woman falls on a pitch-fork, and drives the handle through her perineum, we call
that pathologic—abnormal, but if a large baby is driven though her pelvic floor, we
say that is natural, and therefore normal. If a baby was to have its head caught in a
door very lightly, but enough to cause a cerebral hemorrhage, we would say that is
decidedly pathologic, but when a baby’s head is crushed against a tight pelvic floor,
and a hemorrhage in the brain kills it, we call this normal. . . . I have often wondered
whether Nature did not deliberately intend women to be used up in the process of
reproduction, in a matter analogous to that of the salmon, which dies after spawning.
DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 41.
67. Pike, supra note 65, at 609-10.
68. Hermer, supra note 11, at 329-30.
69. Id.
70. See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing the reasons why regulations have been placed
on the midwifery profession).
71. Hermer, supra note 11, at 326 (emphasis added).
72. Tovino, supra note 15, at 94.
73. Id. at 97-98 (citing Act of Sept. 1, 2000, ch. 303, 2000 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 303, § 4(d),
at 2137 (Deering)).
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across North America to evaluate the safety of home births involving lay
midwives.74 Of the mothers involved in the study, 12.1% required transfer
to a hospital either during or directly after giving birth.75 While no maternal deaths occurred, there were eleven infant deaths—roughly two deaths
per 1000 intended home births.76 The study pointedly observed that the low
rate of infant mortality was similar to that occurring in low-risk hospital
births.77
Another finding of the study, stressed repeatedly by midwifery supporters, involved the low rates of intervention occurring during midwifeassisted home births.78 Some argue that most obstetrical interventions
during labor and delivery have “little, if any, effect” on maternal and infant
mortality and morbidity.79 For example, caesarean sections have been
attacked as problematic, causing deaths due to anesthetic accidents, hemorrhage and infection, as well as urinary tract infections, and nonfatal complications of blood clots.80 These procedures occur in 19% of hospital births,
but appear in only 3.7% of home births.81 Episiotomies—incisions made
into the opening of the vagina to preserve the pelvic floor during labor and
prevent trauma to the fetus’s head—have been maligned as yielding no real
benefits to either mother or infant, but rather increasing the risk of incontinence and severe tears.82 The episiotomy rate is 10.9% for hospital births,
and 3.8% for home births.83
The study noted that a final advantage of home births is the significantly reduced financial cost involved.84 On average, an uncomplicated

74. Johnson & Daviss, supra note 18, at 1. The breadth of the study was furthered by the
fact that NARM made participation in the study mandatory as a prerequisite for recertification. Id.
75. Id. at 2. According to the study, of the women who intended to have a home birth from
the beginning of the pregnancy, the participants were on average older, of a lower socio-economic
status, had more advanced educational degrees, and were less likely to be African-American or
Hispanic. Id. Of the 83.4% who were transferred before delivery, over half were due to failure to
progress, pain relief, or exhaustion. Id. For those women who were transferred after delivery, the
reasons included maternal hemorrhage, retained placentas, and respiratory problems in the
newborn. Id. The midwives involved in the study considered only 3.4% of the transfers to be
“urgent.” Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id. at 2.
79. Hermer, supra note 11, at 342.
80. Id. at 343.
81. Johnson & Daviss, supra note 18, at 2.
82. Hermer, supra note 11, at 345 n.131. Studies conducted on more holistic alternatives to
episiotomy–such as the use of oils and lubricants, massage and manual support, and warm
compresses–have yielded varying results. Patricia Aikins Murphy & Julie Baker Feinland,
Perineal Outcomes in a Home Birth Setting, 25 BIRTH 226, 233 (1998).
83. Johnson & Daviss, supra note 18, at 1418.
84. Id. at 1419.
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vaginal birth in a United States hospital costs three times as much as a
similar home birth with a midwife.85 A large part of this cost is due to the
“routine use” of intervention procedures.86 During the North Dakota legislative hearings on Senate Bill 2377, one midwife-supporter, who had
previously undergone three home births, testified that she was never
charged a flat fee; rather, the rate for her midwife was informally based on
“whatever they could pay.”87
However, economical analyses and statistical similarities between
midwives and physicians do not automatically favor the dispensing of midwifery regulations. Midwife supporters readily admit that a multitude of
problems may arise.88 The supporters simply contend that complications
arise in only 10% of births, and such problems should not require excessive
scrutiny on the field of midwifery.89 However, one in ten births will by
necessity still require some form of intervention that an ill-equipped or
improperly trained midwife may not be fully prepared to handle.90
Furthermore, at least one study has shown that physicians are far more
successful than midwives when certain complications are present.91 The
study also showed that the infant mortality rate is over three times higher in
home births involving post-date, twin, or breech deliveries.92 While midwives may try to screen out women with high-risk pregnancies early, there
is no surefire method that can readily predict if or when a seemingly low-

85. Id. One study conducted in 1998 found that the cost of home births ranged anywhere
from $800 to $4500. Rondi E. Anderson & David A. Anderson, The Cost-Effectiveness of Home
Birth, 44 J. NURSE MIDWIFERY 30, 32 (1999). The average hospital birth in 1998 was estimated
at approximately $7567. Id. at 33.
86. Johnson & Daviss, supra note 18, at 1419. See Hermer, supra note 11, at 342
(“[Interventions] are costly, both in their own right and in the cascade of subsequent interventions
to which the use of some can lead.”).
87. Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 4 (testimony of Becky Olsen). See House
Committee Hearings, supra note 6, at 13 (testimony of Summer Joy Peterson) (arguing that it is
important for North Dakota ranchers and farmers to have as many children as they want, and to
not have to limit family size because of costs).
88. See Hermer, supra note 11, at 330 (acknowledging fetus malpresentation, entanglement
of fetus in umbilical cord, fetus respiratory or cardiac distress, stuck shoulders, ruptured uterus,
severely torn perineum, and pulmonary embolism of mother as problems that can arise in
childbirth).
89. See id. (“The fact that none of these or other complications arise in [90%] of all births
makes no difference to most physicians, who believe one must be as well prepared as possible for
the [10%] of births in which there are problems.”).
90. Cf. MINN. STAT. § 147D.05(2) (2007) (requiring that midwives form an emergency plan
that would detail the underlying conditions necessitating hospital transfers, as well as procedures
for moving a mother to a hospital environment).
91. Lewis Mehl-Madrona & Morgaine Mehl Madrona, Physician and Midwife-Attended
Home Births: Effects of Breech, Twin and Post-Dates Outcome Data on Mortality Rates, 42 J.
NURSE MIDWIFERY 91, 95 (1997).
92. Id.
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risk pregnancy may turn into a high-risk one.93 Many states have opted not
to leave such complications to chance and have constructed regulations on
the profession to ensure the welfare of mothers and newborns alike.94
Home births attended by midwives have generally been shown to be as
safe as hospital births overseen by medical professionals.95 However, in
many cases an untrained midwife will be ill equipped to handle problems
that do arise.96 When such incidents occur, or when midwives attempt to
circumvent non-midwife-friendly statutes, the fate of their practice rests in
the hands of the law.97
III. MIDWIVES IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Each state has the power to regulate midwives operating within its
borders, and may do so by permitting them to practice, restricting how they
practice, or prohibiting them entirely.98 The states have not been uniform in
their approach to midwifery, which has resulted in a rainbow of various
laws defining the practice across the country.99 Through the action or
inaction of the states, midwives necessarily find themselves within the legal
system, whether through statutory regulations, prosecutions for violating
state statutory law, or from challenges against the regulations placed upon
them.
A. THE STATUTORY REGULATION OF MIDWIVES
The sole common denominator between the states in the regulation of
midwives is that all fifty states allow nurse-midwives to practice under
physician supervision or collaboration.100 State regulation of lay midwives,

93. Hermer, supra note 11, at 332. One study on client screening cautions that risk
assessment is an “ongoing process,” and that factors which need to be considered include the
woman’s predilection to accept responsibility for self-care, her support network during the
childbearing cycle, and the presence or absence of any medical factors that could require
hospitalization. Saraswathi Vedam & Yelena Kolodji, Guidelines for Client Selection in the
Home Birth Midwifery Practice, 40 J. NURSE MIDWIFERY 508, 509 (1995).
94. See discussion infra Parts III.A & III.C (discussing the statutory schemes established by
various states and their subsequent constitutional victories).
95. Hermer, supra note 11, at 326.
96. Mehl-Madrona & Mehl Madrona, supra note 91, at 95.
97. See Hermer, supra note 11, at 355 (discussing potential midwifery prosecutions);
Corcoran, supra note 17, at 661 (discussing midwife attempts to challenge restrictive statutes).
98. Tovino, supra note 15, at 68.
99. See Joleen Susan Pettee, Midwifery: Do Parents Have a Constitutional Right to Choose
the Site, Process, and Attendant for the Birth of Their Baby?, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 377, 377 (1998)
(“[T]he practice of midwifery varies across the nation depending on the legality of the practice
and the licensing requirements of particular states.”).
100. Hermer, supra note 11, at 349.

2008]

NOTE

231

however, varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.101 According to a survey
compiled by MANA in April 2007, twenty-four states allow lay midwives
to practice by licensure, certification, registration, or permit, while ten states
prohibit lay midwives from practicing within the jurisdiction completely.102
In the sixteen remaining states, the legal status of lay midwifery is essentially undetermined.103 Four states do not legally regulate midwives but
also do not prohibit them.104 Ten states allow midwives to practice only by
judicial or statutory interpretation.105
1. States Which Legislate, Certify, Register, or Permit Lay
Midwifery
Licensure of lay midwives is the most direct form of control over the
profession, the primary justification for which is protection from unqualified, incompetent practitioners.106 In many instances, lay midwives who
are currently practicing welcome licensure, believing that it can help insure
their professional future and the quality of their work.107 Of those states
which license lay midwives, the specific entry and practice requirements
vary substantially.108

101. DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 18.
102. Direct-Entry Midwifery State-by-State Legal Status, http://www.mana.org/
stchartfrm.html [hereinafter MANA chart] (last visited Jan. 14, 2007). The states which regulate
midwives through licensure, certification, and registration of permit are Alaska, Arkansas,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. However, some
commentators argue that Georgia and Hawaii make it practically impossible for midwives to
practice by constructing the requirements in a way that is “virtually identical” to those imposed
upon nurse-midwives. Hermer, supra note 11, at 356. The states which prohibit lay midwives are
Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, South Dakota,
and Wyoming. MANA chart, supra note 102. The District of Columbia also prohibits lay
midwifery. Id.
103. Hermer, supra note 11, at 356.
104. MANA chart, supra note 102. The states which do not legally regulate midwives are
Connecticut, Nebraska, Ohio, and West Virginia. Id.
105. Id. Joining North Dakota in allowing lay midwifery only by judicial or statutory
interpretation are Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada,
Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. Id.
106. Corcoran, supra note 17, at 656-57. While many believe that licensing is an effective
way of regulating the profession, some commentators point to studies which suggest that licensing
boards tend to take action against practitioners in the medical field only rarely. DEVRIES, supra
note 3, at 6-7. These commentators conclude that the overall effect of disciplinary action is then
rendered “insignificant.” Id.
107. DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 30.
108. Corcoran, supra note 17, at 658. See Chris Hafner-Eaton, Birth Choices, the Law, and
Medicine: Balancing Individual Freedoms and Protection of the Public’s Health, 19 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 813, 826 (1994) (noting how midwifery regulations vary due to the broad
powers of the states in passing laws pertaining to the public’s health).
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California did not regulate lay midwives until the California Licensed
Midwifery Practice Act of 1993.109 This law established the scope of practice of a licensed midwife and permitted midwives to attend home births
only under the supervision of a licensed physician with a current practice or
training in obstetrics.110 The supervising physician need not be physically
present while the midwife attends to the mother, but must have “reasonable
geographic and/or temporal proximity to the patient” in case of
emergency.111
To qualify for licensure in California, a midwife must successfully
complete a three-year postsecondary midwifery education program and pass
a licensing examination.112 The statute also requires that lay midwives
provide written and oral disclosures to any prospective client.113 These
disclosures include whether the midwife has liability coverage and specific
arrangements for transferring the client to a hospital in case of
emergency.114
Minnesota provides another example of statutory licensing of lay
midwives.115 The state code specifically lists which activities do not fall
under the practice of “traditional” midwifery.116 Lay midwives are required
to screen each client and only accept those who are expected to have a
normal delivery.117 The code also provides that stringent client records are
maintained.118 To be eligible for licensure in Minnesota, a midwife must
submit: (1) a detailed application; (2) a diploma from an approved education program or evidence of completing an apprenticeship; (3) a verified
copy of a NARM-issued credential; (4) cardiopulmonary resuscitation

109. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 2505-08, 2511-2515.5, 2517-2521 (Deering 2004). See
Tovino, supra note 15, at 94-95 (noting the absence of lay midwifery regulations under 1993).
110. Tovino, supra note 15, at 94-95.
111. Hermer, supra note 11, at 353.
112. CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 2512.5(a) (West 2007). The statute further details a specific
curriculum that midwives must complete during the education program, which includes: the art
and science of midwifery, communication skills, anatomy and physiology, obstetrics and gynecology, human sexuality, aspects of normal pregnancy, family planning, newborn care, and
breastfeeding. Id. § 2512.5(a)(3)(A)-(H).
113. Id. § 2508(a).
114. Id.
115. See MINN. STAT. § 147D.01-27 (2007) (establishing licensing procedures and
restrictions on midwives within the state).
116. Id. § 147D.03(3). The statute bars the use of any surgical instrument at childbirth
except to sever the umbilical cord or repair a first or second degree perineal laceration, assist in
childbirth by artificial or mechanical means and remove the placenta accrete. Id.
117. Id. § 147D.05(1)-(4).
118. Id. Such records must include a copy of an informed consent form, evidence of an
initial client screening, a copy of a written plan for the pregnancy and protocol for a hospital
transfer, a record of prenatal and postpartum care, and a detailed record of the labor and delivery
process. Id.
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(CPR) certification; (5) a medical consultation plan; (6) documentation
verifying practical experience; and (7) any other information requested by
the board.119
Some midwifery advocates argue that, even among the states which
legally authorize lay midwifery, regulations and requirements can be so
extensive as to actually inhibit the practice.120 Generally, however, lay
midwives who follow the regulations in these states may at least be assured
that their actions during a home birth will not land them in legal trouble.121
Midwives do not fare as well in states which outlaw the practice out of a
belief that midwifery is contrary to the legitimate practice of medicine.122
2.

States Which Prohibit Lay Midwifery

In the ten states that prohibit the practice of lay midwifery, women who
wish to deliver their children at home, and the midwives who help them,
must do so secretly lest they face prosecution for their actions.123 Practicing
lay midwifery in these states is essentially the same as practicing medicine
without a license.124 As a result, these states often serve as key locations
for lay midwives and their proponents as they seek to establish legitimacy
in the system.125
One of the most contentious areas regarding legislative action has been
in Missouri, where lay midwives—equated to a “shadow network” due to
their inability to practice in the open—have fought for two decades to ease
state regulations which limit midwifery to nurses.126 In the 2007 legislative
session, Missouri lawmakers introduced Senate Bill 303 to create a
licensing board for lay midwives.127 The bill would have provided for the
licensure of any midwife who could provide evidence of certification by
NARM and certification in basic life support and CPR.128 Additionally, to
119. Id. § 147D.17(1). Minnesota also provides that lay midwives may practice within the
state through reciprocity or a temporary permit. Id. § 147D.17(2)-(3).
120. Kerry E. Reilley, Midwifery in America: The Need for Uniform and Modernized State
Law, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1117, 1130 (1986). Georgia is an oft-cited example of this
overregulation, as the state makes the requirements for lay midwives “virtually identical” to those
for nurse-midwives. Hermer, supra note 11, at 356.
121. DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 45.
122. Hafner-Eaton, supra note 108, at 821.
123. Hermer, supra note 11, at 356.
124. Heitzman, supra note 2, at A12.
125. Hermer, supra note 11, at 355.
126. Id. See Virginia Young, Judge Rejects New Midwifery Law on a Legal Technicality,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 9, 2007, at B1 [hereinafter “Young I”] (“Midwifery advocates
have battled for two decades to ease state regulations that limit the practice of midwifery to certain
specialized nurses, working in collaboration with doctors.”).
127. S. 303, 94th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2007).
128. Id.
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become licensed, a midwife would be required to pay a fee and provide
written disclosure forms to all clients.129 However, the bill quickly met
fierce opposition, with one legislator, Senator Chuck Graham, remarking: “I
just don’t trust someone taking an Internet course and then the state saying,
‘Hey, go deliver babies.’”130
Following the bill’s failure, its sponsor, Senator John Loudon, tucked
its language into a health insurance bill and substituted the obscure Greek
term “tocology” for any reference to midwifery.131 The bill was immediately challenged.132 Physicians’ groups argued that the law went beyond
the bill’s title.133 Additionally, the attorney general’s office contended that
the bill’s purpose was to improve health care, which midwifery services
would help accomplish.134 A circuit court judge agreed with the bill’s
opponents, holding that the title was too narrow to encompass midwifery
and struck it down as unconstitutional.135
The fierce contest in Missouri mirrors the attitudes in the other nine
states that prohibit lay midwifery.136 In those states, opponents state that
the practice presents “grave and unacceptable risks,” while midwives argue
that they are being assaulted by a male-dominated medical field that resents
the tradition.137 Within this unstable climate, many lay midwives have
begun to support the idea of licensure, believing that limitations on a
legalized profession would greatly outweigh having to operate under the
threat of prosecution.138 While the conflict rages on, it is likely that the lay
midwives within these states will continue to assist in childbirth without
legal sanction.139

129. Id.
130. Heitzman, supra note 2, at A12.
131. H. 818, 94th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2007); Virginia Young, Doctors Trying to
Block Midwives Law Cite Obscure Wording, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, August 3, 2007, at C3
[hereinafter Young II].
132. Young II, supra note 131, at C3.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Young I, supra note 126, at B1.
136. See Liptak, supra note 16, at A12 (discussing the clashes between lay midwifery
supporters and opponents in the states which outlaw the practice).
137. Id.
138. Katherine Beckett & Bruce Hoffman, Challenging Medicine: Law, Resistance, and the
Cultural Politics of Childbirth, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 125, 135 (2005).
139. Wolfson, supra note 21, at 930.
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3. States That Leave the Legal Status of Lay Midwifery
Undetermined
The states that do not regulate or prohibit lay midwifery, as well as
those that allow lay midwifery only by judicial or statutory interpretation,
do not restrict midwives from practicing within the state.140 However, these
states also fail to provide a legal safety net in case something goes
wrong.141 While they are technically allowed to practice, midwives operating in states with “dubious” laws face the heightened possibility of being
reported for practicing medicine or nursing without a license.142 Consequently, their ability to work within their home states is rife with
complication and tenuous at best.143
In those states where lay midwives are allowed to practice by judicial
or statutory interpretation without further regulation or oversight, midwives
are technically given legal sanction to practice their trade.144 This means
that midwives cannot be prosecuted for the unlicensed practice of medicine
when assisting in a normal birth without using drugs or interventions.145
However, their scope of practice is left undefined, leaving midwives open
to charges of unlawfully practicing medicine if they do intervene or
administer any controlled substance.146 In those states that neither regulate
nor prohibit lay midwifery, lay midwives are left even more exposed, and
any action performed while attending a home birth could be potentially
viewed as the practice of medicine.147
The approaches toward licensing and regulating lay midwives vary
substantially between the states.148 An individual wishing to practice lay
midwifery would need to check the appropriate state code to discover
whether their occupation is permitted, prohibited, or allowed only because
140. Hermer, supra note 11, at 355-56. The concepts of judicial and statutory interpretation
are essentially interrelated, meaning that the courts interpret midwifery statutes and conclude that
midwifery does not constitute the practice of medicine. Id. See Amy Cohen, The Midwifery
Stalemate and Childbirth Choice: Recognizing Mothers-to-Be as the Best Late Pregnancy
Decisionmakers, 80 IND. L.J. 849, 852 n.11 (2005) (describing the process of statutory
interpretation); see also Hafner-Eaton, supra note 108, at 821 (noting that in these states, lay
midwives are allowed to practice so long as their actions do not constitute the unauthorized
practice of medicine).
141. Hermer, supra note 11, at 355-56.
142. See Beckett & Hoffman, supra note 138, at 134 (discussing the tendency of medical
personnel to report midwives to legal authorities).
143. Hermer, supra note 11, at 355-56.
144. Id. at 355.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 356. This is also true of states where there has been no construal of existing law
which in any way sanctions the actions of lay midwives. Id.
148. Corcoran, supra note 17, at 657.
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their legal status is undetermined.149 The necessity of knowing a particular
state’s laws is imperative, because a midwife who violates the law would be
susceptible to prosecution.150
B. THE PROSECUTION OF MIDWIVES
Actions against midwives typically arise when medical and nursing
boards allege that a midwife is practicing medicine, nursing, or nurse-midwifery without a license.151 However, these actions usually do not occur
unless an infant or mother dies during a midwife-assisted birth.152 Additionally, prosecutions typically occur in states which either prohibit lay
midwifery, or leave their legal status undetermined.153 These prosecutions
may hinge upon a variety of issues, including whether childbirth can be
considered a medical condition, whether a midwife has contravened statutory law, and whether a midwife has violated a standard of care to her
patient.154
Several courts have considered the question of whether childbirth could
be considered a medical condition.155 In State v. Smith,156 an unlicensed lay
midwife performed several medical procedures during a birth.157 The procedures included internal vaginal examinations, pelvis measurements, fetal
heartbeat monitoring, and blood and urine examinations.158 The court
found that the practice of midwifery without a license was tantamount to
practicing medicine without a license.159 The court based its decision on
the determination that childbirth itself was a medical condition since it

149. Hermer, supra note 11, at 353.
150. Id. at 355.
151. Corcoran, supra note 17, at 661. Shelby County Prosecutor R. Kent Apsley, who
orchestrated a 2006 case against an Indiana midwife, compared lay midwives to truck drivers who
operate their vehicle without a license. Liptak, supra note 16, at A12. He remarked: “He may be
doing an awfully fine job of driving the truck . . . [b]ut the state requires him to go through
training, have his license and be subject to review.” Id.
152. Liptak, supra note 16, at A12.
153. Hermer, supra note 11, at 355.
154. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing issues arising out of midwifery prosecutions).
155. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 459 N.E.2d 401, 404-05 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the
cessation of pregnancy is a medical condition); Bowland v. Mun. Court for Santa Cruz Judicial
Dist., 556 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Cal. 1976) (holding that the treatment of childbirth is at least a
“physical condition” as contemplated under state statute).
156. 459 N.E.2d 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
157. Smith, 459 N.E.2d at 404.
158. Id. See State ex rel. Mo. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Southworth,
704 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo. 1986) (involving a situation where a midwife was prosecuted for
similar procedures).
159. Smith, 459 N.E.2d at 404-05.
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involved the “cessation or termination of the condition known as
pregnancy.”160
The classification of “childbirth” also became an issue in Bowland v.
Municipal Court for Santa Cruz County Judicial District,161 where the
appellant midwife argued that a California statute, which barred the practice
of medicine without a license, did not apply to midwifery.162 The appellant
reasoned that a woman who is pregnant or undergoing childbirth is not
“sick or afflicted” within the meaning of the provision.163 The court
disagreed, however, and held that complications arising during pregnancy
certainly qualified as sickness and affliction.164 The court further clarified
that even if childbirth did not qualify under this provision, it certainly
satisfied the statute’s licensure requirement for any treatment of a “physical
condition.”165
Actions against lay midwives have also arisen under circumstances
where a midwife has been accused of contravening statutory law.166 In
Devers-Scott v. Office of Professional Regulation,167 the appellant midwife
first argued that the administrative law officer erred in finding that she
improperly maintained her client charts by bringing along an incomplete
chart on a hospital transfer.168 Primarily, the appellant argued that the staff
at the hospital did not review the chart, which would indicate that the
improperly kept chart did not contribute to the infant’s death.169 The court
disagreed, stating that since the law only required a complete chart and did
not contain an “adverse-outcome condition,” a midwife violated the law
solely by failing to maintain the records, and not because the failure to
maintain proximately contributed to the plight of a patient.170 The appellant
160. Id. The statute dealt with the licensing of midwives, and stated in part that a
“midwifery license is subject to suspension, revocation, retirement or surrender for the same
reasons as provided in the case of physicians’ licenses.” IND. CODE § 25-22 5-5-5 (repealed
1993). Since Smith, Indiana has enacted legislation specifically limiting the practice of midwifery
to registered nurses. See IND. CODE ANN. § 25-23-1-13.1 (2007) (requiring those who wish to
practice midwifery to hold a license as a registered nurse).
161. 556 P.2d 1081 (Cal. 1976).
162. Bowland, 556 P.2d at 1084. See CAL. BUS & PROF. § 2141 (amended 1985) (stating in
the original version of the statute that a person who treats the sick or afflicted without a license is
guilty of a misdemeanor).
163. Bowland, 556 P.2d at 1084.
164. Id. at 1085.
165. Id. at 1089.
166. See, e.g., Devers-Scott v. Office of Prof’l Regulation, 918 A.2d 230, 235-37 (Vt. 2007)
(holding that a midwife improperly maintained charts and did not provide competent and safe
patient care).
167. 918 A.2d 230 (Vt. 2007).
168. Devers-Scott, 918 A.2d at 235-36.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 236.
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next contended that she had not violated a rule requiring physician
consultation in certain circumstances, since the client’s fluid discharge was
not one of the fourteen triggers for consultation or transfer specified in the
rule.171 The court struck down this argument as well, noting that the
appellant had violated a broader provision, which simply required that a
midwife provide “competent and safe patient care” in similar situations.172
Further reflecting how broadly the courts will interpret the law when
dealing with midwifery prosecutions, the court in O’Conner v. State of
Washington Department of Health173 held that lay midwives should be held
to the same standard of care as a nurse-midwife.174 In O’Conner, the
appellant was accused of disregarding a reasonable health care provider’s
duty to make recommendations to a client to enable them to make safe and
effective health care decisions.175 The court noted that “the single most
important concern in midwifery practice is safety.”176 As a result, the court
upheld the agency’s finding that there should be no difference in the care a
midwife provides, regardless of whether he or she provides hospital-based
interventionist care or non-interventionist, patient-oriented care.177
While even some midwifery opponents have expressed their hesitation
over prosecuting midwives, the practice still exists, and at times can be
rigorous.178 To date, prosecutions against midwives have been attempted in
half of the states.179 However, midwives have often taken the law into their
own hands, and have tried to challenge the constitutionality of the
regulations imposed upon them.180

171. Id. Within the state’s Administrative Rules for Licensed Midwives, Vermont
enumerates fourteen circumstances that require a midwife to transfer patients to a hospital or
consult with a physician. 04-030-360 VT. CODE R. § 3.14.3 (2007). These “triggers” include
unforeseen multiple fetuses, a prolapsed umbilical cord, and an infant with abnormal vital signs.
Id.
172. Devers-Scott, 918 A.2d at 236-37.
173. No. 54835-2-I, 2005 WL 2338685 (Wash. App. Div. Sept. 26, 2005).
174. O’Conner, 2005 WL 2338685, at *4.
175. Id. at *3.
176. Id. at *4.
177. Id. at *3. But see DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 5 (arguing that establishing a standard of
care limits experimentation with new techniques).
178. Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 239-40
(2007). In one example of how far states have gone to prosecute midwives, California once set up
a series of sting operations to arrest midwives practicing without a license. Id. at 239.
179. Beckett & Hoffman, supra note 138, at 134.
180. See generally Reilley, supra note 120, at 1131-42 (detailing various constitutional
challenges brought by midwives against regulatory statutes).
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C. THE CONSTITUTION AND MIDWIFERY LAW
While many midwifery-related actions arise from government agencies
intending to prosecute or revoke the licenses of lay midwives, some actions
are actually raised by midwives themselves.181 In initiating these actions,
midwives hope to overturn “restrictive statute[s] or to clarify” what they
consider to be “ambiguit[ies] in the law.”182 These actions generally take
the form of constitutional challenges brought under the principles of due
process, privacy, and void-for-vagueness.183 A survey of these cases
reveals the courts’ pattern of upholding midwifery regulations in a nearunanimous fashion.184
1.

Due Process Challenges

The right to follow a chosen profession is a property interest protected
by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.185 In Sammon v. New Jersey
Board of Medical Examiners,186 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
considered whether a New Jersey statute requiring licensing, the successful
completion of an examination, and a physician-endorsed application, violated the constitutional rights of midwives who wished to legally practice
within the state.187 The appellant midwife argued that the statute deprived
midwives of their right to work in a chosen profession and prevented
parents from choosing the birthing style and attendant of their choice.188
In determining the level of scrutiny to apply, the court noted that the
statute did not prohibit midwifery, nor limit where or how birthing may take

181. Corcoran, supra note 17, at 661.
182. Id.
183. See Hermer, supra note 11, at 327 (noting generally that some lay midwives challenge
regulatory statutes on constitutional grounds). While constitutional challenges are certainly the
most common actions brought by lay midwives, other forms do arise. In 2007, an Oregon
midwife, whose privileges to deliver babies were revoked (for undisclosed reasons), filed an antitrust lawsuit against the hospital, claiming that her dismissal was simply the effort of a business
trying to eliminate competition in the birthing market. Colin Fogarty, Salem Hospital Sends
Midwives Packing, Oregon Public Broadcasting (2007), www.publicbroadcasting.net/opb/news.
newsmain?action=article&ARTICLE_ID=1090088 (last visited Jan. 14, 2007). Challenges have
also been made—although rarely—under the Equal Protection Clause. See State v. Kimpel, 665
So. 2d 990, 994 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (striking down an Equal Protection argument under
rational basis review because midwives are not a suspect class).
184. See discussion infra Part III.B.1-2 (detailing unsuccessful constitutional challenges to
statutes).
185. Lange-Kessler v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 96-7632, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 15275, *6 (2d.
Cir. Mar. 26, 1997). The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments dictate that no state shall “deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
186. 66 F.3d 639 (3d Cir. 1995).
187. Sammon, 66 F.3d at 641.
188. Id. at 644.
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place.189 Rather, the court held that the statute only regulated the
qualifications of the individuals who may practice midwifery.190 Concluding that this regulation did not implicate a fundamental right, the
Sammon court applied a rational basis review to determine whether the New
Jersey Legislature could have rationally concluded that a legitimate state
interest would be served by the statute.191 The court first noted there was a
legitimate interest in protecting the health and welfare of mothers and
children within the state.192 Furthermore, the court recognized that
educational requirements may further a state’s interest in assuring that midwives are qualified to perform their jobs.193 The court ultimately held that
the regulatory scheme was rationally related to legitimate state interests and
struck down the midwife’s claim.194
Also considering the issue of a midwife’s due process rights, the court
in Hunter v. State195 reiterated the notion that statutory regulations on midwifery did not foreclose parents from engaging midwives or giving birth at
home.196 Instead, the statute merely regulated who may engage in the
practice of midwifery, much like statutory regulations on who may practice
medicine.197 The court in Lange-Kessler v. Department of Education198
went even further by citing Roe v. Wade199 for the proposition that
protecting the health and welfare of mothers and infants was an “important
and legitimate” interest.200 The court also determined that the New York
Legislature could have reasonably believed that requiring midwives to complete a nursing program and become affiliated with a medical professional

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 645.
192. Id. at 646.
193. Id.
194. Id. In Lange-Kessler v. Department of Education, the court had further reason to
consider an argument that regulations barred mothers from choosing home births. No. 96-7632,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 15275, *13 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 1997). The appellants argued that the New
York regulations—which effectively required an education in nursing for any midwife—would
prevent home births altogether, as physicians and nurse-midwives would refuse to attend them due
to peer pressure and insurance concerns. Id. The court, opting not to reach a conclusion on
whether there is a right to choose a home birth, dismissed the argument, stating that the mothers
had submitted no evidence indicating that they either sought, or were unable to find, licensed
nurse-midwives or physicians to perform a home birth. Id. at *14.
195. 676 A.2d 968 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
196. Hunter, 676 A.2d at 975.
197. Id.
198. 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 15275 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 1997).
199. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
200. Lange-Kessler, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 15275, at *7, 9.
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would render them more fit to practice medicine than direct-entry
midwives.201
Due process challenges have ultimately proved futile, as the courts
have consistently found that the right to practice in a chosen profession is
not fundamental.202 As such, regulations on midwifery have been shown to
bear a rational relation to the protection of public health and safety.203 The
issue of health and safety has bred similar holdings when women have
argued a privacy right in utilizing the birth attendant of their choice.204
2.

Privacy Challenges

The constitutional right to privacy has been expanded over the years to
protect certain personal choices relating to childrearing, marriage, procreation, and abortion.205 This logic has also been extended into arguments that
midwifery regulations invade upon the privacy rights of a woman giving
birth.206 Specifically, midwifery advocates argue that a woman has the
fundamental right to choose who will help deliver her child.207
However, privacy claims in midwifery challenges have not fared well
due to the general limitations placed upon the constitutional right to

201. Id.
202. Reilley, supra note 120, at 1131.
203. Id. See Leigh v. Bd. of Registration in Nursing, 481 N.E.2d 1347, 1377, 1382-83
(Mass. 1985) (upholding a statute requiring a certificate from a nursing board to practice
midwifery).
204. See Reilley, supra note 120, at 1142 (noting that courts have found privacy arguments
to be unpersuasive).
205. Bowland v. Mun. Court for Santa Cruz County Judicial Dist., 556 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Cal.
1976). The right to privacy has been derived from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV, V, IX, XIV. The Constitution
generally protects all individuals from unjustified state interference. Planned Parenthood of Se.
Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 (1992). As the United States Supreme Court stated, a person’s
right to privacy applies not only to the “breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers . . . but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty,
and personal property.” Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). This right is spelled
out in the Fourth Amendment, which recognizes the right of people to be “secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
However, the Court has found a privacy right scattered throughout the rest of the Constitution,
whether in the First Amendment’s right of association, the Fifth Amendment’s protection against
self-incrimination, or the Ninth Amendment’s guarantee of rights beyond those etched onto the
Constitution itself. U.S. CONST. amend. I, V, IX. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965) (describing expansive privacy rights found in the Constitution).
206. Wolfson, supra note 21, at 930.
207. Reilley, supra note 120, at 1140. More generally, proponents argue that privacy
challenges are a perfect vehicle for attacking midwifery statutes, as childbirth by nature implicates
intensely personal decisions of women on how to use their body and how to begin their child’s
life. Barbara A. McCormick, Childbearing and Nurse-Midwives: A Woman’s Right to Choose, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 661, 713 (1983).
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privacy.208 These limitations often stem from the regulatory trimester
scheme established in Roe, which recognized that a state has a greater
interest to intervene in a pregnancy during the third trimester.209 Based on
this concept, the right to privacy begins to detach from childbirth decisions
once the child can be universally considered as a “third person” who will be
affected by the decisions of the mother.210
In Connecticut v. Menillo,211 the United States Supreme Court considered whether it was appropriate to convict an individual, who was not a
physician, for attempting to provide an abortion.212 The Court reviewed its
previous decisions regarding abortion and noted that a woman has the right
to privacy only as long as the procedure is “as safe for the woman as normal
childbirth.”213 The Court held that the state’s interest in maternal health
justified requiring those who perform such procedures to have medical
training.214
Therefore, the right to privacy mellows at the time of birth, when the
state’s interest in the life and health of the mother and child trumps the
mother’s right to choose the manner and circumstances in which a child is
born.215 The court in Bowland applied this logic to midwifery law, stating
that the right to privacy has never been interpreted so broadly as to affect
when and how a baby is born.216 While the California Legislature had
never before attempted to require women to give birth in a hospital or with
a physician in attendance, the court found that the California Legislature
may require those who assist in childbirth to be properly trained and
educated to protect the welfare of those involved.217

208. See, e.g., Bowland, 556 P.2d at 1089 (holding that the right to privacy does not include
choosing the manner in which a child is born).
209. Pike, supra note 65, at 611. While the Roe Court established that a mother has privacy
rights that the state may not infringe upon, the Court recognized that the state’s interest in
potential human life grows substantially as the woman grows closer to term. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973). The Court elaborated by noting that when a fetus becomes viable, it
reaches a “compelling point” where the state’s interest may supersede privacy rights to intervene
in the pregnancy. Id. at 163.
210. Wolfson, supra note 21, at 945.
211. 423 U.S. 9 (1975).
212. Menillo, 423 U.S. at 9.
213. Id. at 10-11.
214. Id. at 11.
215. See State v. Kimpel, 665 So. 2d 990, 994 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (“When the fetus is
viable . . . the mother’s privacy rights are subjugated to the governmental interest in protecting
both hers and the child’s safety.”).
216. Bowland v. Mun. Ct. for Santa Cruz County Judicial Dist., 556 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Cal.
1976).
217. Id. The Bowland court further noted that the policy rationale of protecting a mother and
child under the care of a midwife is the same behind prohibiting the abortion of a viable unborn
child. Id.
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The right to choose a midwife can be viewed as a privacy issue under
several concepts, including the right of personal autonomy, bodily integrity,
and parental authority.218 However, midwifery supporters have been unsuccessful in convincing the courts to recognize a privacy right in choosing
one’s birth attendant.219 Even with the difficulty of mounting challenges
under theories of due process or privacy, some midwives have been more
successful in attacking the language of the statute itself.220
3.

Void-for-Vagueness Challenges

While midwives do not fare well in due process or privacy challenges,
a more balanced outcome exists when midwifery statutes are attacked on
the premise that they are void-for-vagueness.221 Under this test, a statute is
rendered void if an accused could not reasonably know that his conduct was
prohibited, or if the language of the statute leaves doubt as to which
individuals fall within the scope of the law.222 When courts are persuaded
by these arguments, the ambiguous or restrictive language is stripped of its
application.223 Thus, midwives are exempt from the imposed regulations,
and their continued practice without a license is prevented from being
deemed illegal.224
The court sided with the midwives in Peckmann v. Thompson 225 when
it reviewed an Illinois statute prohibiting unlicensed persons from the
“practice of medicine in all of its branches.”226 The court found that the
statute did not define this phrase and noted that it did not necessarily
encompass assisting the normal delivery of a healthy child.227 Therefore,
the court held that the statute failed to provide reasonable notice to persons
of ordinary intelligence that their conduct was illegal.228 As further
218. Cohen, supra note 140, at 869-73.
219. See id. at 875 (discussing the courts’ refusals to recognize a privacy right in choosing a
birth attendant).
220. See discussion infra Part III.C.3 (discussing more favorable outcomes on vagueness
challenges).
221. See Cohen, supra note 140, at 852-53 n.11 (noting that while constitutional challenges
are usually unsuccessful, statutes have been stricken on void-for-vagueness claims).
222. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757 (1974). See United States v. Nat’l Dairy Corp., 372
U.S. 29, 32 (1963) (noting a presumption of validity and that the Court will favor interpretations
of the statute that support constitutionality); Boyce Motor Line, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S.
337, 340 (1952) (“A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give notice of the required
conduct to one who would avoid its penalties.”).
223. Corcoran, supra note 17, at 661.
224. Id.
225. 745 F. Supp. 1388 (C.D. Ill. 1990).
226. Peckmann, 745 F. Supp. at 1393.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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evidence of the statute’s unconstitutionality, the court noted that the state
legislature had recently removed all references to midwives in a statute
defining medical practices.229 This action could have bolstered an individual’s conclusion that midwifery is not considered to be a medical
practice.230
Another midwifery victory arose in Leggett v. Tennessee Board of
Nursing,231 in which the court contemplated whether the Board of Nursing
had jurisdiction over a licensed nurse when she was rendering services as a
lay midwife.232 The court noted that the Tennessee Legislature had failed to
include the “care of women during pregnancy” in the statutory definition of
“practicing medicine.”233 Because of this technical deficiency, the court
held that midwifery practices were outside of the board’s jurisdiction.234
The court held that the board could only punish a nurse if he or she
performed acts which could only be accomplished with a nursing license,
such as dispensing prescription medication.235
Void-for-vagueness is not always a successful avenue for midwife
challengers, however.236 In Bowland, the plaintiffs argued that the statutory
language, which barred the unlicensed practice of medicine, could be construed so broadly as to forbid innocuous conduct such as a library loaning
out medical textbooks or advising a friend to drink orange juice for a
cold.237 The court dismissed this argument, finding instead that the
Tennessee Legislature obviously intended to apply the statute to people

229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 612 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).
232. Leggett, 612 S.W.2d at 479.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 481.
235. Id. However, the court concluded its analysis by noting that midwives could be
properly penalized by a tribunal under the laws applicable to all people within the state. Id. This
outcome reflects how a lay midwife may be charged in a state like North Dakota which allows the
practice by statutory and judicial interpretation; since lay midwives are outside the scope of
nursing, any punishment would be levied by the courts and not the administrative boards in charge
of regulating medical professionals. See generally Hermer, supra note 11, at 355-56 (“A [lay
midwife] in that state, on the other hand, is her own mistress . . . again, with the significant
proviso that, should she need to intervene in a birth in order to avert disaster, she may be subject
to prosecution.”).
236. See, e.g., Bowland v. Mun. Court for Santa Cruz County Judicial Dist., 556 P.2d 1081,
1087 (Cal. 1976) (holding that the unlicensed practice of medicine was obviously limited to the
practice of “healing arts”); State ex rel. Mo. State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts v.
Southworth, 704 S.W.2d 219, 223-24 (Mo. 1986) (holding that people of common intelligence
could understand the phrases “practice of medicine” and “practice of midwifery”).
237. Bowland, 556 P.2d at 1087.

2008]

NOTE

245

purporting to practice the “healing arts,” under which the statute
specifically included the practice of midwifery.238
The court in State ex rel. Missouri State Board of Registration for
Healing Arts v. Southworth239 was even more direct in its analysis.240 The
outcome specifically stated that the question of vagueness hinged upon
whether the phrases “practice of medicine” and “engage in the practice of
midwifery” were terms of common understanding.241 Dismissing the challenge, the court noted that people of common intelligence could easily understand these concepts.242 Specifically, the court pointed to the appellant’s
testimony in which she had personally testified as to the definition of a
midwife.243
When the practice of midwifery is left unregulated, or allowed by
leaving the legal status of the profession undetermined, midwives are left
susceptible to prosecution.244 Furthermore, midwives have not had much
success in defending themselves by attacking midwifery regulatory
schemes.245 However, by embracing some form of regulation that is fair to
the profession, midwives can be assured of protection in their practice,
while simultaneously alleviating any concerns about the welfare of those
they care for.246
IV. THE STATUS OF MIDWIFERY LAW IN NORTH DAKOTA
With midwifery law in a constant state of flux and evolution in the
United States—and North Dakota’s recent flirtation with its own set of
regulations—it is certain that the state has not yet reached its final impasse
with the issue.247 When it does resurface, it should be taken seriously, as no
progress will come from turning a blind eye to the issue and leaving
midwifery supporters and the medical establishment pitted against each

238. Id. As to the notion that friendly chit-chat could be included under the provisions, the
court pointed to the statutory exemption for “family remedies,” which would include recommending vitamins, the offer of a “soothing massage,” or the presence of a husband during
childbirth. Id.
239. 704 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. 1986).
240. Southworth, 704 S.W.2d at 223.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 223-24.
243. Id.
244. Hermer, supra note 11, at 355-56.
245. See Cohen, supra note 140, at 852-53 n.11 (discussing midwives’ failed challenges to
restrictive midwifery laws).
246. See discussion infra Part IV (discussing the history of Senate Bill 2377 and proposing
common sense legislation for the regulation of midwives in North Dakota).
247. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of midwifery
in North Dakota and the increasing presence of midwives in the legal system).
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other.248 By reviewing Senate Bill 2377, which was introduced in the 2007
legislative session, and examining the common issues that arise in midwifery law, it is possible to set out a course by which lawmakers in North
Dakota may pass legislation that ensures the safety of mothers and their
children, while remaining fair to the midwives who assist them during
childbirth.249 Achieving equitable regulations may be done by imposing
fair entry requirements, either by eliminating physician supervision requirements or tailoring them to promote a cooperative environment, and giving
midwives a say in how the profession is regulated.250
A. SENATE BILL 2377—NORTH DAKOTA’S FIRST ATTEMPT AT
MIDWIFERY LEGISLATION
Senator Judy Lee introduced Senate Bill 2377 out of concern about
untrained individuals practicing as midwives within North Dakota.251
Senator Lee assured the on-looking legislators and concerned citizens that,
“this doesn’t mean that somebody can’t choose to make a home birth
delivery, but it does mean that people who call themselves midwives need
to be trained professionally.”252 As introduced, however, the legislation
would have effectively added North Dakota to the list of states that prohibit
lay midwifery outright.253
The bill itself opened with a bang by amending the state’s criminal
code to make it a class B misdemeanor for a person to provide obstetrical
services to an individual unless that person is licensed as either a registered
nurse or physician under North Dakota law.254 A violation of the provisions could be prosecuted as either the unauthorized practice of medicine or
the unauthorized practice of nursing.255 The bill defined “obstetrical services” as “the physical examination of an individual at any stage of her
pregnancy and . . . the physical supervision or provision of services to an

248. Wolfson, supra note 21, at 956.
249. See discussion infra Parts IV.A-B (summarizing the hearings on and provisions of
Senate Bill 2377 and proposing common sense legislation for midwives in North Dakota).
250. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1-3 (detailing provisions for midwifery legislation).
251. Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 1 (statement of Sen. Judy Lee,
Chairwoman, S. Comm. on Human Serv.).
252. Id.
253. Gwen Bristol, Bill Could Make Lay Midwifery Illegal in N.D., MINOT DAILY NEWS,
Feb. 8, 2007, at B1.
254. S. 2377, 2007 Leg., 60th Sess. (N.D. 2007). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-12.1-09 (2007)
(requiring that nurses successfully complete a nursing education program, pass an examination,
and present a completed application and fees); id. § 43-17-18 (requiring that a physician graduate
from a medical school, successfully complete a licensing examination, and present an application
attesting to the “good moral character” of the applicant).
255. S. 2377, 2007 Leg., 60th Sess. (N.D. 2007).
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individual during her labor or childbirth.”256 Through this definition, the
proposed statute essentially required that a woman seeking a home birth
find either a doctor or registered nurse to perform house calls not only
during labor, but in the preceding months as well.257 However, the bill also
included an exemption for family members who were not providing services as a “business arrangement,” and a Good Samaritan Clause for both
lay people and medical services operators assisting in emergency
situations.258
While considering this legislation, the Senate Human Services
Committee received impassioned testimony related to the bill, with opponents—generally mothers and fathers who had utilized lay midwives during
home births—arguing that birth is not a disease, but a “natural process a
woman’s body was made to do all on its own.”259 Meanwhile, bill supporters—generally professionals from the medical community—stressed the
mantra of patient safety.260 After extensive deliberation, the committee
agreed on the general merits of midwives and opined that better legislation
could be drafted to actually assist them in their practice.261 The committee
amended the bill into a resolution directing the Legislative Council to study
midwifery law and determine whether current law already addressed the
problem.262
Senator Joan Heckaman, a cosponsor of the original legislation,
introduced the amended Senate Bill 2377 to the House Human Services
Committee on March 12, 2007.263 She testified that she supported the
changes to the bill because of her concern for women in rural areas of the
state who rely on midwives, and her belief that midwifery would continue

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. North Dakota has a general Good Samaritan Act, which gives immunity to an
individual who renders aid to the injured or ill, unless the acts constitute intentional misconduct or
gross negligence. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1 (2007). There is also a specific provision in the
code bestowing the same protection—and exceptions—to licensed physicians performing
emergency obstetrical care to a “pregnant female in active labor.” Id. § 32-03.1-02.1. However,
this immunity is waived should the physician either collect a fee or perform the act with the
expectation of remuneration. Id.
259. Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 4 (testimony of Becky Olsen).
260. Id. at 3 (testimony of Wanda Rose, Vice President, North Dakota Nurses Association).
Dr. Rafael Ocejo, a Bismarck pediatrician and neonatologist, quickly conceded that childbirth is
“one of the most natural processes on earth,” but stressed that birthing results “can vary from
disaster to amazingly good outcomes, depending on where and how a baby is delivered.” Id. at 2
(testimony of Dr. Rafael Ocejo).
261. Id. at 9-10.
262. Engrossed S. 2377, 2007 Leg., 60th Sess. (N.D. 2007).
263. House Committee Hearings, supra note 6, at 1 (testimony of Sen. Joan Heckaman).
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to be “an important part of our state.”264 The House Committee heard testimony from many of the same individuals heard by their Senate counterparts, even retracting statements from some midwifery supporters that they
would not be opposed to a form of regulation on lay midwives in the
state.265 However, several midwifery supporters testified against the study,
citing concerns ranging from an opposition to regulations as a whole, to the
belief that the Legislative Council would conduct an “unfair” study that
failed to factor in “certain considerations” supportive of lay midwives.266
In the end, the House Committee recommended a Do Not Pass on the
bill, believing that, “[b]y studying [midwifery] you are only endorsing the
idea of putting . . . further restrictions” on the practice.267 The full House of
Representatives followed the House Committee’s lead and defeated the bill
in a near unanimous vote.268 By doing so, the legislature opted to maintain
the status quo, leaving the scope of practice undefined, with no assurances
that midwives are qualified to assist in childbirth, and no protection for
midwives should something go wrong during a delivery.269
B. A “FRIENDLY” APPROACH: COMMON SENSE REGULATIONS FOR
LAY MIDWIVES IN NORTH DAKOTA
The North Dakota Legislature opted against midwifery regulations in
part because it believed that midwifery was not a large enough problem in
the state to warrant legislation.270 However, the legislature need not wait

264. Id. Senator Heckaman proved a frequent critic of the bill’s original language throughout the Senate hearings as well, stating that she would prefer to turn the legislation around and “do
something positive in this area instead of penalizing people.” Senate Committee Hearings, supra
note 3, at 10. See David M. Smolin, The Jurisprudence of Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court,
75 MARQ. L. REV. 975, 1009 (1992) (stating that where midwifery is overregulated or prohibited,
rural women are often left with no prenatal or birthing care within a reasonable distance of their
homes).
265. See House Committee Hearings, supra note 6, at 2-3 (testimony of Becky Olsen)
(stating that some form of registry or regulation would have a positive effect in the state).
266. See id. at 12-13 (testimony of Donna Henderson) (arguing that regulations would
prevent people from having safe home births who had previously experienced complications
during hospital births); id. at 13 (testimony of Summer Joy Peterson) (arguing against a study on
the grounds that it would only promote the idea of regulations); id. at 2 (statement of Patrick
Hatlestad) (“What I have heard from people about the concern of the study is the fact that the
medical community will shake the direction [of the study].”).
267. Id. at 1 (statement of Jasper Schneider).
268. H. Journal, 2007 Leg., 60th Sess., at 1147 (N.D. 2007), available at http://www.legis.
nd.gov/assembly/60-2007/journals/hr57.pdf#Page1147.
269. Hermer, supra note 11, at 355. See DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 120 (“[I]n the absence of
licensing laws, legal action becomes the only method for the regulation of midwives.” (citing
Laura King, Midwives’ Uneasy Truce in Jeopardy, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, July 10, 1981, at 4A)).
270. House Committee Hearings, supra note 6, at 1 (statement of Curt Hofstad).
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for a pandemic or the death of a newborn before it takes action.271 The law
does not exist solely as a reactionary entity, but as a proactive force for
good.272 To that end, midwives should embrace a common sense form of
legislation, as the affordance of a legal status brings with it privileges and
benefits to the profession.273 Such benefits include a sense of public
legitimacy, alleviating the fears of legal action, and an improved business
model by which midwives may advertise and perform their functions in the
open.274
Historically, scholars have drawn a distinction between “friendly” and
“hostile” licensure, which are defined by the individuals who control the
licensing process.275 However, these basic concepts may be applied to midwifery regulations in general so that the North Dakota Legislature can draft
laws that make sure the profession is properly regulated, but also give
“friendly” deference to those midwives whom the law is overseeing. This
approach can be helpful when dealing with the basic topics that arise out of
midwifery regulations, including entry requirements, physician supervision
provisions, and the make-up of regulatory boards.276
1.

Entry Requirements

The first step in constructing friendly midwifery legislation is to ensure
that entry requirements are both adequate and appropriate.277 Lay midwives
have traditionally received training through a combination of self-education
and apprenticeship, which allows them to “sustain a naturalistic,
271. See generally Julia Solo, Urban Decay and the Role of Superfund: Legal Barriers to
Redevelopment and Prospects for Change, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 285, 327 (1995) (“The problem with
reactive legislation . . . is that it attempts to solve one problem while creating a host of others. A
move toward proactive legislation is essential if we hope to avoid the unintended effects of hastily
passed legislation in the future.”).
272. Id.
273. See DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 30 (noting that many midwives openly embrace
licensure, believing that such legislation will help insure their professional future).
274. Id. at 117. See Anderson & Anderson, supra note 85, at 30 (stating that the relatively
low number of home births in the United States may be a by-product of more successful
advertising by hospitals).
275. DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 29. In the context of midwifery, “friendly” licensure would
be controlled by a board of individuals who are themselves lay midwives; “hostile” licensure
would place midwives under “outside control,” such as nursing or medical boards. See generally
id. (explaining the difference between “friendly” and “hostile” licensure).
276. See discussion infra notes 277-311 and accompanying text (recommending provisions
on these issues which would be fair to midwives, while taking into consideration safety issues
pertaining to mothers and children).
277. See Corcoran, supra note 17, at 669-70 (“[E]ntry requirements for direct-entry
midwives can both protect the public and accommodate the unique skills and knowledge of directentry midwives.”); see also Reilley, supra note 120, at 1142 (stating that the ultimate goal in
constructing reasonable midwifery restrictions is to make sure that midwives remain a safe
alternative to physicians).
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noninterventionist view of birth.”278 Because this philosophy is at the core
of the lay midwifery outlook, entry requirements which rely exclusively on
formal education have been attacked as “inappropriate.” 279 While a standard is necessary to ensure the safety of childbirth, any entry requirements
placed upon midwives must be tempered to ensure that the heart of lay
midwifery is not ripped from the profession’s ribcage.280
An appropriate approach to entry requirements would be to require the
successful completion of the national certification standards prescribed by
NARM.281 To meet these standards, midwives must pass a written examination and either complete an accredited program, or show that they possess
the equivalent knowledge and skills that would be gained through more
formalized training.282 Upon completion of the certification process, a midwife is entitled to use the title “Certified Professional Midwife” in his or her
practice.283 By putting the focus on knowledge and skills, rather than the
method by which a midwife has acquired them, assurances of safety and
competency may be met without requiring additional education unless the
midwife needs it to comport with the standard of care.284
States that provide for no training requirements endanger the public’s
safety by potentially allowing incapable people to practice midwifery.285 At
the same time, such requirements should be reasonable in order to allow
qualified individuals into the profession.286 However, such entry requirements may still prove irrelevant if midwives will later be burdened with
thorny physician supervision requirements.287

278. DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 92.
279. Corcoran, supra note 17, at 670. See Jo Anne Myers-Ciecko, Evolution and Current
Status of Direct-Entry Midwifery Education, Regulation, and Practice in the United States, With
Examples from Washington State, 44 J. NURSE-MIDWIFERY 384, 386 (1999) (noting that an
independent review of midwifery entry requirements found that a skills-based formula was the
“best practice”).
280. See discussion infra notes 281-87 (describing such balanced entry requirements).
281. Corcoran, supra note 17, at 670.
282. The North American Registry of Midwives, The Certified Professional Midwife (1998)
[hereinafter NARM Standards]. See Myers-Ciecko, supra note 279, at 389-90 (describing NARM
entry-to-practice standards).
283. Myers-Ciecko, supra note 279, at 386.
284. Corcoran, supra note 17, at 670. Furthermore, under a system of this nature, a midwife
who has not gone through a formal education, and whose knowledge and skills lack in certain key
areas, could be required to undergo education in only those subjects, rather than completing an
entire curriculum. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 2512.5(a)(3)(A)-(H) (2007) (listing examples of
which subjects a midwife may need to have baseline knowledge and skills).
285. Reilly, supra note 120, at 1143.
286. Corcoran, supra note 17, at 670.
287. See Myers-Ciecko, supra note 279, at 389 (noting that physician supervision
requirements are often difficult to fulfill, thus making it difficult for midwives to lawfully
practice).
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Physician Supervision

Provisions requiring physicians to supervise midwives are the most
contentious aspects of the regulatory debate and have been imposed on both
lay and nurse-midwives.288 In many instances, midwives find it difficult to
locate physicians who are willing to supervise them.289 In the instances
when they do find a supervising physician, many states leave the definition
of “supervision” ambiguous.290 As a result, a physician who objects to
midwifery may impose stricter requirements than necessary.291
Due to the possibility of the misuse of physician supervision and the
heavy burden of finding a physician willing to enter into a supervisory
relationship, legislation could be drawn up that would eliminate supervision
requirements entirely.292 However, to maintain the highest degree of safety
and care, a substitute provision could be implemented under which midwives would enter into a “collaborative” relationship with physicians.293 In
this type of relationship, midwives would simply have a working relationship with a physician with whom they might confer or refer complicated
cases.294 Such a provision could either be mandatory or made optional and
offered to midwives under some form of incentive program.295

288. See Hermer, supra note 11, at 349, 353 (discussing the supervision requirements on
nurse-midwives and lay midwives).
289. DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 115. See Tovino, supra note 15, at 95 (noting that in
California, where lay midwives are required to have physician supervision, such support is so
rarely forthcoming that in 2001 only one of 111 licensed midwives actually obtained a supervising
physician).
290. Hermer, supra note 11, at 349-50.
291. See id. (noting that ambiguous statutory language allows physicians to impose
unreasonable medical requirements and oversight on midwives).
292. See Sara K. Hayden, The Business of Birth: Obstacles Facing Low-Income Women in
Choosing Midwifery Care After the Licensed Midwifery Practice Act of 1993, 19 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 257, 262 (2004) (discussing the difficulty in finding physicians willing to supervise
midwives); Myers-Ciecko, supra note 279, at 389-90 (recommending that laws be created which
do not require midwives to be directed or supervised by other health care practitioners).
293. Hermer, supra note 11, at 349.
294. Id.
295. See generally Myers-Ciecko, supra note 279, at 389 (noting that physicians and
midwives should find a way to have effective consultative or collaborative relationships). Any
mandatory “physician collaboration” provision would have to take into account the pervasive
hesitation on the part of physicians to enter into relationships with midwives. See Hermer, supra
note 11, at 349-50 (discussing the difficulty of midwives in finding physician assistance). Under
such a system, physicians should be required by the state board of health to enter into such
relationships, which would ensure that midwives could lawfully practice in the state. See
generally Tovino, supra note 15, at 104 (noting that in California, when a midwife is unable to
find a physician who will provide supervision, he or she cannot legally practice). Under an
optional program, a midwife who elects to enter into a collaborative relationship with a physician
might opt out of certain educational entry requirements for licensure in the state. This would have
the same effect as the NARM standards, which give midwives the option of completing an
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Some midwifery supporters view the physician supervision
requirement as a means for the medical establishment to belittle midwives’
training and expertise.296 It is important for these provisions to be either
banished from statutory regulations, or drawn up in a manner that would
ensure that midwives retain some control over their occupation.297
However, for midwives to truly have a hand in their own destinies, it would
also be necessary for them to have a functioning role in overseeing the
profession at large.298
3.

Boards Overseeing Lay Midwives

Historically, commentators have stressed that the weakness of midwifery as a profession stemmed in part from placing the oversight of the
profession into the hands of medical and nursing boards, rather than in a
board of midwife examiners.299 It seems unlikely that a state would adopt
provisions to create a board that would vest all control over the profession
into the hands of midwives.300 However, the trend among states that license
midwives has been to establish subsidiary boards, which include midwives
in their membership, to assist in regulating the profession.301
Texas has such a two-tiered system in which a “Midwifery Board”
adopts procedures and reports to the Texas Department of Health on matters
involving midwifery within the state.302 The Midwifery Board is made up
of three midwives with at least three years of experience, one certified
nurse-midwife, one physician certified in obstetrics and gynecology, one
physician certified as a pediatrician, and three members of the public—one
of whom is a parent with at least one child born with the assistance of a
educational program, or obtaining proficiency through training. See generally NARM Standards,
supra note 282 (detailing the NARM standards).
296. Tovino, supra note 15, at 104.
297. See supra notes 288-95 and accompanying text (detailing the delicate nature of
physician supervision requirements and how they can be fashioned to be fair to lay midwives).
298. Reilley, supra note 120, at 1144 (noting that by self-policing the profession, midwives
would have an enhanced interest in its success, and could ensure the quality of their services).
299. DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 29. See Reilley, supra note 120, at 1144 (discussing medical
boards which inhibited the growth of the midwifery profession).
300. See DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 29 (stating that, in the past, the licensing of midwives has
been notoriously “hostile” in nature).
301. See, e.g., 007-13 ARK. CODE R. § 102 (2007) (establishing an Advisory Board to meet
at least annually and at the discretion of its chairperson to review midwifery rules and regulations
and propose changes as needed); S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. § 61-24(Q) (2007) (stating that the
Department of Health shall appoint a Midwifery Advisory Council to assist the department in
matters pertaining to midwifery training, practices, and regulation); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.12957.10 (2007) (establishing an Advisory Board on Midwifery to assist the Board of Medicine in
formulating midwifery regulations); WASH. REV. CODE § 18.50.140 (2007) (creating the
Midwifery Advisory Committee whose members are appointed by the Secretary of Health).
302. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 203.051 (Vernon 2007).
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midwife.303 This board is responsible for adopting proposed rules regarding
the standard of practice, documentation of midwives, educational requirements, the reporting and investigating of complaints, and disciplinary
actions.304 The Texas Department of Health and its own internal board then
act upon these recommendations by implementing official rules for the
profession.305
Florida implemented a similar system by statute when it established the
Council of Licensed Midwifery, which reports to the state’s Department of
Health.306 The council acts in an advisory role to the department by
developing rules relating to training requirements, fees, informed consent
forms, emergency plans, records and reports, and the state licensing examination.307 However, the statute specifically allots other functions to the
council, including monitoring lay midwifery in other states and countries,
educating the public and medical community on midwifery, and recommending future changes to midwifery law within the state.308
Midwives have long been concerned that restrictive licensing regulations could change the relationships they enjoy with their clients, transforming these relationships into more formal, medical entities.309 Including
midwives in key advisory board positions can provide a balanced approach
to regulations that are both “sufficiently dynamic and holistic.”310 More
importantly, by giving midwives a role in the decision-making process,
North Dakota can ensure that midwives’ voices are heard, and that the
profession remains tailored to the “naturalistic, noninterventionist”
principles upon which it is based.311

303. Id. § 203.052.
304. Id. § 203.151(a)(1)-(6).
305. Id. § 203.156.
306. FLA. STAT. § 467.004 (2007). The Council of Licensed Midwifery is composed of:
three physicians, one nurse-midwife, three licensed midwives, and one independent state resident.
Id. § 467.004(2).
307. Id. § 467.004(3)(a).
308. Id. § 467.004(3).
309. See DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 110 (discussing concerns of midwives over the effects of
regulations).
310. See Recent Legislation, Health Care Law—“Drive Through Delivery” Regulation—
Massachusetts Requires Hospital Stays of Forty-Eight Hours for Newborns and Postpartum
Mothers—Act of Nov. 21, 1995, ch. 218 §§ 1-10, 1995 Mass. Legis. Serv. 726, 726-28 (West), 109
HARV. L. REV. 2116, 2120 (1996) (discussing the advantages of balanced midwifery regulations).
311. See DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 92 (discussing the naturalistic approach and philosophy
of midwives); see also Hermer, supra note 11, at 334 (discussing the criticisms of nursemidwives, whose ties to the medical community are seen as moving the profession away from its
natural-oriented nexus).
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V. CONCLUSION
Lay midwives in North Dakota are wedged into an intriguingly tenuous
position.312 On the one hand, they are technically allowed to practice their
wares, free from regulation and oversight.313 On the other hand, they are
operating in a vague legal climate, leaving them susceptible to charges of
unlawfully practicing medicine for stepping anywhere near the boundaries
of what constitutes a medical procedure.314 Likewise, North Dakota
mothers who choose home births currently have unfettered access to lay
midwives.315 However, with no board or body regulating the profession,
these mothers also run the risk of placing their welfare—and that of their
children—in the hands of someone who lacks the necessary training or
competency.316
With thirty-six states either permitting or prohibiting lay midwifery by
statute, the clear trend across the country is to regulate the profession.317
North Dakota nearly jumped into this fray with Senate Bill 2377, which, by
restricting all forms of obstetrics to either registered nurses or physicians,
would have essentially prohibited lay midwives from assisting in childbirth.318 Instead, the North Dakota Legislature opted to pass no law at all,
becoming entangled in its concerns over protecting the health and safety of
its mothers and newborns, while securing the practice of lay midwifery in
the state.319 To appease both of these concerns, the Legislature should pass
friendly, commonsense legislation that strikes a middle ground between the

312. See generally Hermer, supra note 11, at 355 (discussing statutory-interpretation states,
like North Dakota, where midwives walk a tightrope between the freedom to practice and the fear
of prosecution).
313. See id. (stating that in North Dakota and other “statutory interpretation” states,
midwives may practice without state regulation).
314. See id. (discussing the risk of prosecution faced by midwives in “statutory
interpretation” states).
315. See DEVRIES, supra note 3, at 101 (stating that licensure may reduce the number of
births with midwife-assistance, due to stricter limits on the definition of “normal childbirth,”
mandated education, and increased surveillance over the practice).
316. See Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 1 (testimony of Sen. Judy Lee,
Chairwoman, S. Comm. on Human Serv.) (discussing the concern over untrained individuals
performing services as midwives); id. at 1-2 (testimony of Bruce Levi, N.D. Med. Ass’n) (stating
that anyone who provides obstetrical services should be competent to do so).
317. MANA Chart, supra note 102.
318. See S. 2377, 2007 Leg., 60th Sess. (N.D. 2007) (requiring a medical license to practice
midwifery); Bristol, supra note 253, at B1 (discussing the potential impact of S. 2377 on lay
midwives in North Dakota).
319. See Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 1 (testimony of Senator Judy Lee,
Chairwoman, S. Comm. on Human Serv.) (discussing concerns over untrained midwives
endangering women and infants); House Committee Hearings, supra note 6, at 1 (testimony of
Sen. Joan Heckaman) (expressing a desire to maintain midwifery presence in North Dakota).
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interests of all involved.320 Such a balance may be fashioned by (1) imposing skill and knowledge-based requirements upon midwives; 321 (2)
eliminating the need for physician supervision, or replacing it with a more
collegial, collaborative relationship;322 and (3) giving midwives a voice in
the regulatory process.323
In November 2006, Lynette Johnson of Tuttle, North Dakota prepared
for her first home birth with a midwife, expecting to bring her third child
into the world.324 However, after one child was born, her midwife realized
that she was not done giving birth and Ms. Johnson ended up delivering
triplets in her bedroom.325 Had she known earlier that she was pregnant
with triplets, she would have likely had a caesarean section, and the children would have been placed in a hospital’s intensive care unit.326 However, she was happy that she was able to bring them into the world at home
and stated that she would use a midwife for a home birth again.327 It was
Ms. Johnson’s unique birth experience that initially prompted the creation
of Senate Bill 2377.328 It is up to the North Dakota Legislature to make
sure that mothers like Ms. Johnson can continue to have home births, and
can have them as safely as possible.
Christopher Rausch*

320. See discussion supra Part III.C (suggesting legislation which would impose reasonable
regulations on the profession).
321. See Corcoran, supra note 17, at 670 (noting that entry requirements which focus on skill
and knowledge will net the same benefits as examining formal education, and will encourage
more lay midwives to enter the profession).
322. See Hermer, supra note 11, at 349-50 (describing the arduousness of physician
supervision requirements, and the more beneficial collaborative relationships).
323. See discussion supra notes 299-311 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of
establishing midwife-friendly regulatory boards).
324. Sara Kincaid, It Touches Our Hearts, BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 15, 2007, at A1.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 3, at 9.
*
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